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ABSTRACT 
In comparing second-best prices and quantities, studies assume that quantities bind with 
probability one.  We present a more general and realistic model of second-best regulation where 
quantity instruments can bind with probability less than one.  This additional flexibility of 
quantity instruments makes them much more efficient than previously realized.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Equation Section 1 
  Our profession’s fondness for the use of economic incentives notwithstanding, regulation 
via direct control is commonplace in the real world.  Diverse consumer and producer activities, 
from speeds on public thoroughfares to the emission of industrial pollutants from smokestacks, 
are controlled using maximum allowable limits.  Moreover, even though there is considerable 
heterogeneity amongst regulated individuals and industries, most standards are applied uniformly 
and consistently.  Such uniform standards, which are second-best policies under heterogeneity, 
may not be binding on all members of the regulated group.  To continue with our previous 
examples, so-called ‘Sunday drivers’ choose to drive far below the speed limit, while many 
industrial producers emit pollutants at rates less than their mandated limits.  Hence, many 
quantity regulations in place today stipulate an upper bound on an agent’s activity, rather than an 
absolute level for it.  Almost all existing economic studies fail to capture this potential diversity 
of behavioral response to quantity regulation.  Instead, it is implicitly assumed that quantity 
instruments represent centralized control by diktat: a regulator announces a level of activity, and 
this level is then dutifully attained, without regard for prevailing economic incentives. 
  This paper presents a theoretical analysis of quantity regulation under heterogeneity 
where variable responses can occur at the individual level.  The main results are derived under 
simple assumptions that can be solved graphically.  We show that quantity regulation, when 
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viewed as an upper bound rather than an absolute level, offers additional flexibility to both the 
regulator and the regulated group.  We develop general conditions – much broader than those 
suggested by previous studies – under which quantity regulation is preferred to price regulation. 
  In Section 2 of this paper, we review the existing literature on regulation and instrument 
choice under heterogeneity.  The following section presents the general model used.  In Section 
4, we consider conditions under which quantity regulation can lead to variable individual 
response.  Analytical rankings for quadratic functional approximations are derived in Section 4.  
These expressions are used to explore the conditions under which each policy instrument is 
optimal.  Finally, the last section provides a brief discussion and conclusion. 
 
2.  REGULATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND HETEROGENEITY 
  Optimal regulation under conditions of heterogeneity requires contingent schemes that 
differentiate each type of economic agent and each state of nature (Arrow, 1969, Tietenberg, 
1974, Baumol and Oates, 1988).  With a delegation approach, the regulator imposes a payment 
function that induces optimal agent behavior (Roberts and Spence, 1976).  Alternatively, a 
regulator may use a revelation mechanism in a regulatory scheme that requires truth-telling on 
the part of heterogeneous agents (Kwerel, 1977, Dasgupta et al., 1980).  However, informational 
requirements and political considerations often disallow contingent regulation.  Indeed, even 
though most regulatory problems are characterized by significant uncertainty or heterogeneity, 
most current state and federal regulations are uniform rather than contingent in nature (Russell et 
al., 1986). 
  In a second-best setting, uniform price and quantity instruments will no longer have the 
same distributional and welfare effects.  The conditions under which one type of instrument is 
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superior to the other have been the subject of considerable debate over the last three decades.  
Weitzman (1974) was the first to derive analytical expressions for the welfare ranking of uniform 
price and quantity instruments under uncertainty.  His original result – that the optimal second-
best policy depends only on the relative slopes of the marginal cost and marginal benefit 
functions – is so powerful and elegant that it is taught in virtually all undergraduate and graduate 
economics curricula.  Weitzman’s model used quadratic approximations to the marginal cost and 
benefit functions, assumed no correlation between cost and benefit uncertainty, and implied 
uniform supply response by producers to unit increases in taxation.  Over the last three decades, 
Weitzman’s results have been extended and discussed in countless papers (Cropper and Oates, 
1992, provide a convenient review).  Major assumptions have been relaxed in theoretical studies 
(e.g. Roberts and Spence, 1976, Laffont, 1977, Malcomson, 1978, Stavins, 1996), but empirical 
applications have also been undertaken (e.g. Nichols, 1984, Kolstad, 1986).  However, these 
studies all implicitly assume that optimal uniform standards will bind under all states of nature. 
  We are aware of only two papers in this large literature that consider the possibility that 
uniform standards may behave as upper bounds rather than binding in all states of nature.  
Hochman and Zilberman (1978) analyze how taxes and standards affect aggregate output, input 
use and pollution in industries characterized by distributions of fixed proportions production and 
pollution functions.  With a fixed proportions production function, quantity regulation always 
takes the form of an upper bound.  Hochman and Zilberman show that the profitability of 
heterogeneous microunits will depend on the type of policy instrument employed.  However, 
because a fixed proportions production function is used, adjustment to regulation occurs only at 
the extensive margin.  Each microunit has a binary response to regulation: it may choose to 
operate, or to shut down.  Individual production units cannot adjust at the intensive margin in 
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response to regulation.  Wu and Babcock (2001) consider firm adjustment at both intensive and 
extensive margins for the problem of second-best regulation under heterogeneity.  Although they 
do recognize the possibility of upper bound-type quantity regulation under heterogeneity, they 
neither derive analytical results for the optimality of corner solutions nor recognize the potential 
occurrence of multiple local optima under quantity regulation. 
  Finally, several authors (e.g. Besanko, 1987, Helfand, 1991) have noted that direct 
controls may be implemented as a wide variety of regulations: as levels of input use, output, or 
pollutant emissions, as maximum pollution-output ratios, or as mandates on the use of pollution 
control technology.  While all of these options represent direct control, each will have slightly 
different output, welfare and distributional effects.  However, once again, these studies assume 
that standards represent absolute levels of agent behavior rather than upper bounds.  Conversely, 
the present study explores conditions under which overcompliance with uniform standards is not 
only rational, but may also be a desirable feature of regulation. 
  In the above discussion, we have used the terms ‘uncertainty’ and ‘heterogeneity’ as 
though they were interchangeable.  As noted above, some portions of the existing literature study 
regulation with heterogeneity, whereas other portions are concerned with regulation under 
uncertainty.  Before proceeding, we will comment on the equivalence of heterogeneity and 
uncertainty for the particular set of issues discussed in this paper.  With uncertainty, only a single 
state of nature will ultimately occur, but a priori we can only make probabilistic statements 
about the expected outcome.  Under heterogeneity, all possible states of nature occur 
simultaneously and the average effect is observed.  Second-best regulation with ex ante 
uncertainty and second-best regulation with spatial heterogeneity are formally equivalent.  In 
both cases, the regulator must choose a single policy instrument that is only optimal in an 
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average sense.  In an uncertain setting, the actual outcome will not in general be equal to the 
expected outcome.  Conversely, under a heterogeneous system, the outcome is deterministic and 
uniquely defined.  Stylistically, regulation under uncertainty often assumes a single firm or an 
industry composed of homogeneous firms.  In modeling heterogeneity, the regulated industry is 
taken to be composed of firms with a distribution of production or pollution technologies.  In this 
paper, we couch our model in terms of a heterogeneous, polluting industry.  However, the same 
analytical framework applies equally well to the case of producer or consumer regulation under 
uncertainty.  Note also that in Weitzman’s original article, as in much of the following work, the 
problem of second-best regulation under uncertainty is expressed as a tradeoff between a social 
benefit function and a production cost function.  Our own preference is to present a model in 
terms of production and damage functions, but the two approaches are completely 
interchangeable. 
3.  THE MODEL 
  An industry is a unit continuum of firms, each with a production technology and a 
pollution technology.  The production technology captures the net surplus of a given level of 
production activity by each firm.  For example, the production technology could represent the 
value of the marginal product of input use net of all input costs.  Conversely, the pollution 
technology captures the net costs of each firm’s activity that are not internalized in the firm’s 
decision-making process.  In an agricultural setting, the pollution technology could involve 
fertilizer runoff into rivers, pesticides leaching into groundwater, or downstream siltation caused 
by soil erosion.  We assume that production and pollution technologies are independent attributes 
of each firm.  For example, the net marginal product of fertilizer use may represent the 
production technology and the marginal social cost of fertilizer runoff may represent the 
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pollution technology.  Alternatively, production technology may be a function of capital vintage, 
whereas pollution technology may be related to geographical location. 
 Possible  production  technologies  are contained within the set I.  For simplicity, assume 
that there are only two production technologies, so that  { } , I LH =  and the industry comprises 
low (L) and high (H) productivity firms in proportions θ  and ( ) 1 θ −  respectively.  Similarly, 
pollution technologies are contained within the set J.  There are two possible pollution 
technologies,  { } , JC D = , so that the industry contains clean (C) and dirty (D) firms in 
proportions η and ( 1 ) η −  respectively.  There are thus four types of firms in the industry, 
contained in the set  { } ,,, I J ×= L CL DH CH D.  The choice of discrete, rather than continuous, 
distributions of production and pollution technologies allows both tractable analysis and 
graphical solution.  In particular, the assumption of two discrete production technologies allows 
the support of the net surplus function to be partitioned into two sets, in each of which the net 
surplus function is concave.  Our major results may be extended to the case of continuous 
production and pollution technologies, but at the expense of clarity. 
  Each firm with production technology iI ∈  uses a scalar input,  i x + ∈  , in the 
production of a numeraire good.  Each firm’s quasi-rents net of input prices are given by the 
production function  () ii f x .  The industry faces a horizontal output demand curve.  While 
limiting, this assumption is commonplace in the literature on regulation under uncertainty and 
heterogeneity (e.g. Weitzman, 1974, Helfand, 1991).  Production functions are continuously 
differentiable and satisfy   and  () () () 0, 0 ii i i i fx f x x ′′ ′ >> 0, i f <( ) 0 i f 0 = .  Moreover, we assume 
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that the marginal productivity of H-type firms is higher than that for L-type firms for all output 
levels, so that  () () LH f xf x ′′ ≤ for all positive values of x. 
) i x
() C gx g ′ ≤
()0
c
ii fx ′ =
()0 ji >
  Input use by each firm causes a negative externality.  For a firm with production 
technology i and pollution technology  j J ∈ , the damage caused by using  i x  units of input is 
given by  , where we assume that  ( j g ( ) ( ) ( ) 0, 0, 0 ji ji ji gx gx ′′ ′ >>> gx  and  .  We 
also assume that   for all positive values of x, and that 
() 0 j g =
() D x ′ ( ) 0 ( ) 0 D g ′ L ′ > f , so that it is 
socially desirable for both low and high productivity firms to operate at some scale.  This 
assumption implies that no firms within the industry will shut down as a result of regulation, and 
adjustment will take place at the intensive margin only. 
0
  Net surplus is given by the sum of quasi-rents and damages caused by production, 
  () () iii j ji Efx Egx    −     (1) 
where  [ ] i E ⋅  is the expectation operator taken over realizations of the production technology and 
[ ] j E ⋅  is the expectation operator taken over realizations of the pollution technology. 
  In the absence of any regulation, each firm will maximize quasi-rents by using an input 
level 
c




H x x ≤ .  This means that without regulation, high 
productivity firms will, on average, produce more pollution than low productivity firms.  
Because  , high productivity firms will also produce more pollution per unit of input 
than low productivity firms.  Note, however, that clean, high productivity firms may produce less 
total pollution and less pollution per unit of input than dirty, low productivity firms.  Which firm 
type produces more pollution per unit of output will depend on the functional form of the 
production function. 
gx ′′
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We assume that the regulator is constrained to use a single, uniform, instrument.  Under 
such conditions, the welfare effects of second-best price and quantity instruments will, in 
general, differ. 
3.1.  Uniform price controls 
The regulator seeks a uniform price instrument, t , which will maximize net surplus, defined by 
*
  () ( ) () ( )
* argmax iii j ji
t
tE f x t E g x
+ ∈
t     =−     R
 (2) 
where  () i x t  is the input use decision by a firm of type i facing price instrument t.  The price 
instrument represents the per-unit tax on the input  i x .  We assume that tax revenues are recycled 
in a non-distorting fashion and thus net out of equation (2). 
  The first order condition corresponding to equation (2) is 





Efx t t Egx t t
tt
∂ ∂  ′ ′ ⋅− ⋅   ∂∂  
i   =   (3) 
where  () i x tt ∂ ∂  is the marginal response of a firm of productivity type i to a unit increase in the 
price instrument from its current level, t.  Each firm must take the price instrument into account 
in its own production decision, and will choose its input use so that  () () ii f xt t ′ = .  Thus, each 
firm equates the value of its marginal product and the per-unit tax.  Under the price instrument, 
more efficient firms will continue to use more inputs than less efficient firms, so that 
() L () H x tx t ≤ .  As before, high productivity firms will on average produce more pollution per 
firm and more pollution per unit of input than low productivity firms.  Once again, the relative 
magnitudes of pollution per unit of output by each firm type will depend on the functional form 
of the production function.  Note also that if the regulator chooses a system of input-use quotas 
that are transferable on a one-to-one basis then input use, output and pollution for each firm type, 
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as well as net surplus, will be identical to that for the optimal uniform price instrument.  Because 
of this, transferable quota schemes will not be considered further in this paper. 
3.2.  Uniform quantity instruments as absolute levels 
If the regulator decides to address the production externality using a prescribed absolute level of 
input use, then the choice of an optimal uniform quantity is given by 
  () () argmax ii j j
X
XE f X E g
+ ∈
X     =−     R
 (4) 
Equation (4) is the usual formulation of the choice of uniform quantity instrument under 
uncertainty or heterogeneity (e.g. Weitzman, 1974, Laffont, 1976, Stavins, 1996).  It is implicitly 
assumed that the optimal instrument  X  will bind on both high and low productivity firms.  The 
formulation of the quantity regulation problem as a choice of absolute and enforced input or 
output levels, as expressed in equation (4), is the approach taken in the vast majority of existing 
studies.  The first order condition corresponding to equation (4) is 
  ( ) ( ) ii j j EfX EgX   ′′ =      (5) 
Thus, the optimal uniform quantity instrument will equate the expected value of the marginal 
product of input use with the expected marginal damage.  A comparison of equations (3) and (5) 
shows that optimal uniform price and quantity instruments will generally result in different input 
use decisions. 
3.3.  Uniform quantity instruments as upper bounds 
If there is enough heterogeneity between firm types, the assumption that the optimal quantity 
instrument binds on all types of firm need no longer hold.  In this case, the choice of the optimal 
uniform quantity instrument will be given by 
  () ( ) () ( ) argmax iii j ji
X
XE f x X E g x X
+ ∈
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where  ( i ) x X  is the input use decision by a firm with production technology i facing quantity 
instrument X.  Now, from the original assumptions about the two different firm types, we know 
that any optimal quantity instrument will always bind on high productivity firms.  Thus, the 














Xi f f X
xX X
 ′ ≤  = 







Using these definitions and equation (6), the first order condition for optimality of the uniform 
quantity instrument falls into one of two cases. 
Case 1.   X %  binds on both types.  If  ( ) 0 L fX ′ > % , the quantity instrument will bind on both high 
and low productivity firms.  The relevant first order condition is equation (5), so that  X X = %  as 
defined in equation (4). 
Case 2.   X  binds only on efficient types.  If  ( ) 0 L fX ′ ≤ % , the quantity instrument  X %  will bind 
only on high productivity firms.  The relevant first order condition is then given by 
  ( ) ( ) Hj j f XE g X   ′′ =  
%%  (8) 
In this case, the regulator targets the quantity regulation solely on the subset of high productivity 
firms, allowing low productivity firms to operate unconstrained. 
  The difference between uniform quantity instruments as absolute levels and as upper 
bounds is easily demonstrated graphically.  Figure 1 represents the regulator’s problem, showing 
the tradeoff between social costs and private benefits.  The marginal values of the low and high 
productivity technologies are shown by  ( ) L f x ′  and  ( ) H f x ′  respectively.  The expected marginal 
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product is given by .  Three possible distributions of pollution technologies, denoted 
A, B, and C, are represented in Figure 1.  The expected marginal damage under the dirtiest 
pollution technology, A, is given by 
() ii Efx ′   
( ) AA E gX ′      for output level X.  The cleanest technology is 




  It is clear from Figure 1 that under pollution technology A, the only quantity instrument 
that satisfies first order condition (5) is an absolute level of input use given by  A X .  Under 
pollution technology C, although  X  satisfies first order condition (5), low productivity firms 
will never operate where their marginal product is negative.  Instead, they will use  ˆ X  units of 
input under a quantity regulation of   (Figure 1).  But in this case, net surplus can be strictly 
improved by increasing the quantity regulation to  C X % , thus targeting the regulation to high 
productivity types.  Hence, pollution technology C corresponds to Case 2 and first order 
condition (8) above.  Finally, under pollution technology B, the regulator has a choice of two 
quantity instruments that satisfy local optimality conditions (Figure 1).  The quantity instrument 
B X  satisfies condition (5) and is an absolute level-type regulation that binds on all firm types.  
Quantity instrument   satisfies (8), binding on high productivity types but allowing low 
productivity types to operate at the unconstrained input use level  ˆ X .  Thus, the net surplus 
function has two local maxima.  However, the assumption of only two production technologies 
allows the support of the net surplus function to be partitioned into two sets, with a discontinuity 
at  ˆ X .  Each portion of the net surplus function then contains a unique, well-behaved maximum.  
If multiple local maxima exist, the choice of a global maximum will depend on the functional 
forms of the production and damage functions.  Similarly, if production technologies are a 
distribution rather than a binary set, it is no longer possible to partition the net surplus function 
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into well-behaved subsets, although a unique global optimum that satisfies the relevant first order 
conditions will still exist. 
  If only Case 2 above holds, the regulator will equate the value of the marginal product of 
input use for high productivity firms with the expected marginal damage of those firms.  Low 
productivity firms will be allowed to operate unconstrained.  What are the advantages of this 
kind of quantity regulation?  The benefits of targeting regulations specifically for the high 
productivity firms may more than compensate for the additional damages caused by allowing 
low productivity firms to operate unconstrained.  Upper bound-type regulation will yield higher 
input use and higher outputs than absolute level-type regulation for both high and low 
productivity firms.  Additionally, because low productivity firms are unconstrained and high 
productivity firms face no tax burden under upper bound-type regulation, there may be a broad 
base of industry support for such regulation. 
  Policymakers are particularly interested in how industry-wide input use, output, and total 
pollution change under the alternative policy instruments described above.  A comparison of 
optimality conditions (3), (5) and (8) suggests that, in general, optimal uniform price and 
quantity instruments will lead to different total input use amounts, and hence different aggregate 
output, pollution and net surplus. 
 
4.  FEASIBILITY OF UPPER BOUNDS AS REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS 
We seek to characterize the relative importance of upper bound-type quantity regulations 
as compared to absolute level-type quantity regulations.  Clearly, if upper bounds are only 
theoretically feasible under an extremely restricted set of conditions, their practical implications 
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are limited.  However, without specific functional forms, analytical comparisons of the features 
of each policy instrument are not possible. 
  To proceed, we make the same assumptions about functional forms as Weitzman (1974), 
namely that quadratic approximations to the production and damage functions are adequate.  













f Xf X X X
gX






By following Weitzman’s functional forms, we can analyze the potential importance of upper-
bound type quantity regulation in a framework familiar to readers and directly comparable to 
previous work.  Additionally, as in Weitzman’s study, we assume that: 
  () () ( ) ( ) ; LH CD f xf xf g xg xg ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ == ==  (10) 
Under these assumptions, firm type i’s marginal response to a unit increase in the price 
instrument,  () i x tt ∂ ∂ , is constant and given by  ( ) 1 i x tt f ′′ = ∂∂ , so that equation (3) can be 
simplified to give 
  ( ) ( )
*
ijj i tE E g x t
*     ′ =    
 (11) 
Optimality conditions (5) and (8) for uniform quantity instruments are unchanged from our 
previous analysis.  With these assumptions about the functional forms of the production and 
damage functions, it is possible to obtain expressions for the conditions under which multiple 
solutions to the quantity regulation problem, as well as regulation via upper bounds, are feasible. 
  In order to simplify the analytical results presented, we introduce several parameters.  
The absolute level-type quantity regulation,  X  (Figure 1), forms a convenient baseline for 
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comparison.  Thus, define  () ( ) HL f Xf X γ ′′ =− , so that γ  is the difference in marginal products 
between high and low productivity firms at the optimum quantity instrument  X , as given by 
equation (5).  Recalling that the proportions of low (L) and high (H) productivity firms are θ  and 
( 1 ) θ −  respectively, the variance of  ( ) i f X ′  is defined as 
() () ()
2
2 22 1 ii ii EfX EfX σ θθ γ     ′′ =− =        
− .  The product  ( ) 1 θ θ −  is a measure of the 
skewness of the distribution of production technologies within the industry.  It attains a 
maximum value when there are equal proportions of low and high productivity firms.  Thus, the 
parameter γ  may be thought of as the standard deviation of the marginal productivity at  X  
multiplied by the skewness of production technologies within the industry.  The parameter γ% is 
the difference in marginal products between the two types of firm divided by the marginal 
product of high productivity firms and is defined as  ( ) ( ) ( ( ) HLH H f Xf ′′ =− Xf X X γγ ′ ′ = % f .  
Finally, the parameter β  is defined as the ratio of the elasticity of the expected marginal 
productivity with respect to input use to the elasticity of expected marginal pollution damage 
with respect to input use.  Thus, noting that by definition  () () ii j j EfX Eg X   ′ =  ′
     
, β  is given 
by the expression  () () () () ii j j X fXEfX gXEgX g β      ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ⋅ =−          
X ⋅ f  

=− , 
which is the negative of the ratio of the marginal product to the marginal pollution damage.  The 
parameter β  is always positive, and it captures the relative tradeoff between increased 
production and increased pollution as input use increases.  A value of β  of more (less) than 
unity implies that as a firm’s input use increases, its marginal product will decrease by more 
(less) than the marginal pollution damage increases. 
) ()
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  Using these parameters, we can derive conditions for the feasibility of multiple solutions 
to problem (6), and conditions under which a set input use level or an upper bound are the only 
possible uniform quantity regulations. 











% , multiple solutions to problem 










% , there is only one solution to problem (6) and it involves an 
absolute level of input use that binds on both high and low productivity firms.  If  1 γ ≥ % , there is a 
unique solution to problem (6), but in this case it corresponds to an upper bound-type regulation. 
Corollary 1.  As β  increases (decreases), the range of γ% over which multiple solutions 
are possible also increases (decreases). 
 
Corollary 2.  As θ , the proportion of low productivity firms, increases (decreases), the 
range of γ% over which multiple solutions are possible also increases (decreases). 
  The results contained within Lemma 1 and Corollaries 1 and 2 are conveniently 
represented graphically (Figure 2).  Each of the three panels of Figure 2 corresponds to a 
different proportion of low productivity firms, given by θ  values of 0.8, 0.5 and 0.2.  Feasible 
solutions for the uniform quantity regulation problem are shown for each of these values of θ  in 
the parameter space of 
2 γ%  and  10 log β .  The range of  10 g lo β  corresponds to β  ranging from 
approximately one-fifth to five.  This covers a broad range of relative elasticities of the marginal 
product and marginal pollution damage functions. 
  It is intuitively clear that as the variance in production technology increases, upper 
bounds are more likely to be feasible (Figure 2).  If the variance in production technology 
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becomes large enough, upper bounds become the only possible quantity instrument.  Corollary 1 
states that as the marginal productivity becomes relatively more elastic, the feasibility range for 
upper bounds becomes larger.  As β  increases, the unconstrained input use level for low 
productivity firms will decrease relative to  X , making optimal absolute level-type regulation 
less binding on low productivity firms.  Finally, Corollary 2 states that as the proportion of low 
productivity firms increases, upper bound regulation becomes more feasible.  As θ  increases, the 
expected marginal product moves towards the marginal product of low productivity firms, 
decreasing  X , the optimal absolute level regulation.  Although this increases the likelihood that 
quantity regulation binds on low productivity types, it also increases the separation between 




 and the high productivity firms, leading to an overall increase in the likelihood that 
an upper bound is feasible. 
  Under quadratic damage and production functions and with assumption (10) and the 
relevant optimality conditions, it is possible to characterize the relative input use, output and 
pollution of the various possible policies. 
Proposition 1.  First-best contingent regulation and second-best price regulation and 
absolute level-type quantity regulation will each have the same input use.  If feasible, upper 
bound-type regulation will have a higher input use.  The uniform price instrument will have 
higher aggregate output and damage than under the first-best policy, and the uniform quantity 
instrument will have lower aggregate output and damage than the first-best. Where feasible, 
upper bound-type regulation will have higher aggregate output and more damage than first-best 
and absolute level regulation, but this may be more or less than the output and damage with the 
uniform price instrument. 
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  Note that if low and high productivity firms respond differently to a unit increase in the 
price instrument, then the slopes of their marginal benefit functions will differ.  In this case, first 
best, price and quantity instruments will result in different aggregate outputs and Proposition 1 
will no longer hold. 
 
5.  RANKING OF SECOND-BEST POLICIES 
  In the preceding sections, we have presented three solution concepts to the problem of 
second-best regulation under heterogeneity.  Two of these, a uniform price instrument, and a 
quantity instrument that defines an absolute level of input use, have been analyzed extensively in 
previous theoretical and empirical studies.  The third, an upper bound-type quantity regulation 
that is targeted to high productivity firms but allows low productivity firms to operate 
unconstrained, has not been considered elsewhere.  By definition, each of these second-best 
instruments involves a welfare loss relative to the first-best regulation.  However, as uniform 
policies are pervasive in the real world, we are particularly interested in the performance of these 
second-best policies relative to each other.  Below, we develop comparative measures for pairs 
of these policies and analyze the conditions under which each instrument type will be preferred 
to the others. 
5.1.  Prices vs. Absolute Levels 
The choice of price versus absolute level-type quantity instrument is the problem originally 
analyzed by Weitzman (1974).  As shown in Proposition 1, a uniform price instrument leads to a 





H x tX x t << .  The difference in net surplus between a uniform price instrument and an 
absolute level-type instrument following equations (11) and (5) respectively is given by 
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X xt
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Since the expectation operator is a linear operator, it can be passed through the integral signs to 
give 
  () () {}
()









Lj j Hj j
X xt
ww f zE g zd z fzE g zd θθ ′′ ′′   −= − + − −   ∫∫ z  (13) 
As noted by many previous authors from Weitzman (1974) onward, only one type of 
heterogeneity (in this case the expected marginal product) plays a part in determining the 
difference in net surplus between price and absolute level-type quantity instruments.  The 
magnitude of the difference between realizations of the damage function is irrelevant here, and 
only becomes important if there is a correlation between pollution and production technologies at 
a firm level (Weitzman, 1974, Stavins, 1996). 
  Under our assumption of quadratic production and damage functions, the difference in 
net surplus is given by (Figure 3A) 










σ σ ′′ ′′ − ′′′ ′ +
−= =
′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ −−−
 (14) 
This is an exact analogue to the well-known expression derived by Weitzman (1974) that states 
the comparative advantage of a price instrument over an absolute level-type quantity instrument 
in terms of the relative slopes of the production and damage functions.  Given the model 
presented here, if the marginal production function has a higher slope magnitude than the 
marginal damage function, a uniform price instrument will yield a higher net surplus.  An 
equivalent condition for superiority of a uniform price instrument over an absolute level-type 
quantity instrument is that the parameter β  is greater than unity. 
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5.2.  Absolute Levels vs. Upper Bounds 
Comparisons of the two kinds of quantity instrument, absolute levels and upper bounds, are only 
meaningful if both are feasible, as defined by Lemma 1 (see Figure 3B).  If this is the case, then 
the difference in net surplus between the two instruments is given by 
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%
z  (15) 
where for ease of notation,  ˆ c
L X x = , the input use for low productivity firms in the absence of 
regulation.  Once again, linearity of the expectation operator can be used to simplify equation 
(15) to give 
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 (16) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (16) is always negative and represents the loss in 
surplus from allowing both the unconstrained operation of low productivity firms and higher 
input uses (calculated over the range from  X  to  ˆ X ) for high productivity firms.  The second 
term on the right hand side of equation (16) is positive and represents the gains from targeting an 
upper bound-type regulation to the subset of high productivity firms.  For quadratic production 
and damage functions, the difference in net surplus becomes 
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5.3.  Prices vs. Upper Bounds 
If both types of quantity instrument are feasible then the difference in net surplus between the 
price instrument and the upper bound is simply the sum of the differences between a price 
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instrument and an absolute level and an absolute level and an upper bound, namely the sum of 
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   (18) 
Alternatively, if  1 γ ≥ % , an upper bound is the only feasible quantity-type regulation.  In this case, 
the appropriate difference in net surplus is given by 
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The first term on the right hand side of equation (19) is the difference in net surplus between a 
price instrument and unconstrained operation for low productivity firms under an upper bound.  
This term may be positive or negative (Figure 3C), as the gains from increasing aggregate output 
for low productivity firms may be more or less than the concurrent increase in aggregate 
pollution.  The second term on the right hand side of equation (19) is the difference in surplus 
between the price and upper bound instruments for the subset of high productivity firms.  
Because an upper bound is targeted specifically to high productivity firms, this term is always 
negative.  For quadratic production and damage functions, equation (19) becomes 
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Unlike the simple and elegant comparison between a price instrument and an absolute level-type 
quantity instrument expressed in equation (14), when an upper bound is possible, analytical 
expressions for the differences in net surplus become cumbersome. 
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  By factoring the term  out of expressions (14), (17), (18) and (20), the signs of the 
welfare differences may be rewritten using the three previously defined parameters, 
2 g′′
θ , γ% and 
β .  Recall that θ  is the proportion of low productivity firms and γ% is the normalized product of 
the skewness of production technology type and the standard deviation of the marginal product.  
The parameter β  is the negative of the ratio of elasticities of the marginal product and marginal 
damage functions.  In summary, the signs of differences in net surplus follow: 










% , the only feasible instruments are a uniform price instrument or an 
absolute level-type quantity instrument. 
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% , all three instruments are feasible, so that 
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1 1 (23) 
  The welfare rankings of regulations defined by expressions (21), (22) and (23) are far 
more complex than Weitzman’s original relative slopes criterion, even though the functional 
forms used in this analysis are identical.  However, for upper bound-type regulation to be 
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meaningful in a policy context, it is not sufficient to show that it is feasible.  There must also 
exist significant portions of the relevant parameter space over which failure to consider upper 
bound-type quantity regulation will lead to an incorrect choice of second-best policy instrument.  
Analytical comparison of expressions (21), (22) and (23) is awkward, but the choice of surplus-
maximizing regulation may be presented graphically in a straightforward manner.  The panels of 
Figure 4 show the optimal choice of uniform instrument in the parameter space of 
2 γ%  and 
10 log β  for three values of θ  (0.2, 0.5 and 0.8).  The parameter space of 
2 γ%  and  10 g lo β  and the 
values of θ  used are the same as in Figure 2.  For values of 
2 γ%  greater than unity, the only 
feasible quantity instrument is an upper bound; a dashed line marks the boundary in each panel.  
The range of lo 10 g β  used, around –0.7 to 0.7, implies marginal product functions with input use 
elasticities from one-fifth to five times that of the marginal damage functions in absolute value. 
  As is immediately obvious from Figure 4, there is a significant portion of the studied 
parameter space in which Weitzman’s original analysis is not valid.  There are two separate 
reasons for this.  First, absolute level-type regulation may not be feasible, so that the appropriate 
comparison is between upper bounds and prices.  Second, even when absolute level regulation is 
feasible, an upper bound may be the preferred instrument.  In either case, if the simple ‘relative 
slopes’ rule is applied in these regions, the welfare ranking may be incorrect.  In particular, the 
symmetry of Weitzman’s original result is lost, and the relative slope of the marginal production 
and damage functions no longer uniquely determines the preferred instrument.  Moreover, as θ  
changes, the region in which upper bounds are the preferred quantity instrument changes 
dramatically. 
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Proposition 2.  The greater the proportion of low productivity firms, the larger the 
portion of the parameter space of γ% and β  over which upper bound-type quantity regulation is 
the preferred instrument. 
In particular, for large values of θ , corresponding to a high proportion of low productivity firms, 
upper bounds may be preferable to a price instrument even if the input elasticity of the marginal 
product is much larger in absolute value than the input elasticity of marginal pollution damage 
(Figure 4A).  In other words, quantity regulation using upper bounds may be preferred to price 
regulation even if input use is responsive to price incentives and marginal damage varies little 
with the scale of input use. 
  If the majority of firms are of the low productivity type, then uniform price and absolute 
level quantity instruments will disproportionately penalize high productivity firms in terms of 
quasi-rents.  Thus, using an upper bound-type regulation to target high productivity firms may 
increase net surplus even though input use by the majority of firms moves further away from 
optimal levels.  Conversely, if most of the firms are of the high productivity type, the gains in 
moving to an upper bound from either of the other instruments are small (Figure 4).  In this case, 
high productivity firms are already close to their optimal level of input use.  Allowing low 
productivity firms to operate unconstrained decreases net surplus by a larger amount than is 
gained from targeting the regulation to high productivity firms, even though the proportion of 
low productivity firms is small. 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
  Economic activity is characterized by heterogeneity (Rosen, 2002).  This applies as much 
to consumers and producers as to the externalities arising from their activities.  In the presence of 
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heterogeneity and uncertainty, optimal regulation requires policies that are contingent on each 
possible state of nature.  Practically, however, regulations tend to be consistent and uniform 
despite heterogeneity.  Under such conditions, it is well known that aggregate welfare will vary 
with the choice of second-best uniform instrument.  Within the economics literature, it has been 
common practice to portray second-best regulation as a choice between a uniform price 
instrument and a quantity instrument that enforces an absolute and exact level of behavior.  The 
assumption that quantity controls uniformly constrain heterogeneous agents is at odds with 
observations of real-world regulations, where quantity controls often take the form of upper 
bounds on admissible activity.  Because upper bound-type regulation admits variable individual 
response, it is inherently more flexible than absolute level-type regulation.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
there have been no previous theoretical studies of the conditions under which upper bound 
regulation is either feasible or a welfare-maximizing second-best policy. 
  In this paper, we present a model for the choice of second-best regulation of a polluting 
industry under heterogeneity that includes consideration of upper bound-type quantity regulation.  
Employing the same functional forms as Weitzman (1974) allows the results of that classic study 
to be nested within a more general framework.  The present analysis demonstrates that upper 
bound-type quantity regulations are both feasible and optimal for a broad range of characteristics 
of agent heterogeneity.  In contrast to Weitzman’s simple relative slope criterion for determining 
the optimal second-best instrument, we find that welfare rankings of price and quantity 
instruments also depend on the magnitude and distribution of producer heterogeneity. 
  The option of using an upper bound as a regulatory instrument significantly broadens the 
conditions under which quantity regulation is preferred to price regulation.  In particular, our 
analysis demonstrates that if there are large differences in production technology between firms 
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and only a small proportion of firms are highly productive, upper bounds will be preferred 
almost irrespective of the input elasticities of the marginal production and marginal damage 
functions.  The intuition behind this result is that the gains from targeting quantity regulation to 
firms that are highly productive may outweigh the additional damages caused by allowing low 
productivity firms to operate unconstrained. 
  Finally, there are several additional reasons why an upper bound-type quantity instrument 
may be favored compared to alternative price or quantity instruments.  At least for the functional 
forms used in this paper, upper bounds will lead to higher aggregate input use, which may be a 
popular political goal.  Arguably, all types of firm will prefer an upper bound-type regulation to 
other instruments.  Under an upper bound, low productivity firms are allowed to operate 
unconstrained.  For this subset of firms, an upper bound is clearly preferred to any alternative 
regulation, as it is equivalent to no regulation whatsoever.  Similarly, for high productivity firms, 
production under an upper bound may approach that possible under a uniform price instrument, 
but without any associated tax burden.  Thus upper bound-type regulations may have a broader 
base of political support than alternative instruments. 
 25  
REFERENCES 
ARROW, K. J. (1969), “The organization of economic activity: Issues pertinent to the choice of 
market versus non-market allocation”, The analysis and evaluation of public expenditure: 
The PPB System (Washington DC: Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the 
United States). 
BESANKO, D. (1987), “Performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution”, 
Journal of Public Economics, 34, 19-44. 
CROPPER, M. L., and OATES, W. E. (1992), Environmental economics: A survey, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 30, 675-740. 
DASGUPTA, P., HAMMOND, P., and MASKIN, E. (1980), “On imperfect information and 
optimal pollution control”, Review of Economic Studies, 47, 857-860. 
HELFAND, G. E. (1991), “Standards versus standards: The effects of different pollution 
restrictions”, American Economic Review, 81, 622-634. 
HOCHMAN, E., and ZILBERMAN, D. (1978), “Examination of environmental policies using 
production and pollution microparameter distributions”, Econometrica, 46, 739-760. 
KOLSTAD, C. D. (1986), “Empirical properties of economic incentives and command-and-
control regulations for air pollution control”, Land Economics, 62, 250-268. 
KWEREL, E. R. (1977), “To tell the truth: Imperfect information and optimal pollution control”, 
Review of Economic Studies, 44, 595-601. 
LAFFONT, J. J. (1977), “More on prices vs. Quantities”, Review of Economic Studies, 44, 177-
182. 
MALCOMSON, J. M. (1978), “Prices vs. Quantities: A critical note on the use of 
approximations”, Review of Economic Studies, 45, 203-210. 
 26  
NICHOLS, A. L. (1984), Targeting economic incentives for environmental protection 
(Cambridge: MIT Press). 
ROBERTS, M. J., and SPENCE, M. (1976), “Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty”, 
Journal of Public Economics, 5, 193-208. 
ROSEN, S. (2002), “Markets and diversity”, American Economic Review, 92, 1-15. 
RUSSELL, C. S., HARRINGTON, W., and VAUGHN, W. J. (1986), Enforcing pollution 
control laws (Washington DC: Resources for the Future). 
STAVINS, R. N. (1996), “Correlated uncertainty and policy instrument choice”, Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 30, 218-232. 
TIETENBERG, T. H. (1974), “Derived decision rules for pollution control in a general 
equilibrium space economy”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1, 
3-16.  
WEITZMAN, M. L. (1974), “Prices vs. Quantities”, Review of Economic Studies, 41, 477-491. 
WU, J., and BABCOCK, B. A. (2001), “Spatial heterogeneity and the choice of instruments to 
control nonpoint pollution”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 18, 173-192. 
 























The choice of quantity instrument under alternative pollution technologies. 
 








































Feasibility of absolute level-type and upper bound-type quantity instruments. 
 

















The choice of prices vs. absolute levels under heterogeneity.  Notation in this figure follows that 
in the body of the text.  Capital letters refer to the area of adjacent gray triangles.  Analytical 
expressions for these areas are derived in the Appendix.  In this panel, upper bound-type quantity 
regulation is not feasible.  The comparative advantage of a uniform price instrument over an 
absolute level-type quantity instrument is given by 
() ( )( ) 1
pq w w Area B Area A Area C Area D θθ −= − + − − . 
 
















The choice of absolute levels vs. upper bounds under heterogeneity.  Notation in this figure 
follows that in the body of the text.  Capital letters refer to the area of adjacent gray triangles.  
Analytical expressions for these areas are derived in the Appendix.  In this panel, multiple 
solutions to the quantity regulation problem exist.  The comparative advantage of an absolute 
level-type quantity instrument over an upper bound-type quantity instrument is given by 
( ) 1
qu wwA r e a E A r e a F θ −= − − . 
 
















The choice of prices vs. upper bounds under heterogeneity.  Notation in this figure follows that in 
the body of the text.  Capital letters refer to the area of adjacent gray triangles.  Analytical 
expressions for these areas are derived in the Appendix.  In this panel, absolute level-type 
quantity regulation is not feasible.  The comparative advantage of a uniform price instrument 
over an upper bound-type quantity instrument is given by 
( ) ( ) 1
pu w w Area G Area H Area I θθ −= − − − . 
 









































The choice of second-best instrument under heterogeneity. 
 
 